We introduce here the study of general nonmonotonic rule systems. These deal with situations where a conclusion is drawn from a "system of beliefs" S (and seen to be in S), based both on some "premises" being in S and on some "restraints" not being in S. In the monotone systems of traditional logic there are no restraints, conclusions are drawn solely based on premises being in S. Nonmonotonic rule systems capture the essential syntactic, semantic, and algorithmic features of many nonmonotone systems such as default logic, negation as failure, truth maintenance, autoepistemic logic, and also important combinatorial questions from mathematics such as the marriage problem. This reveals semantics and syntax and proof procedures and algorithms for computing belief sets in many cases where none were previously available and entirely uniformly. In particular, we introduce and study deductively closed sets, extensions and weak extensions. Semantics of nonmonotonic rule systems is studied in part II of this paper and extensions to predicate classical, intuitionistic, and modal logics are left to a later paper.
Introduction
In mathematics, a consequence drawn by a deduction from a set of premises can also be drawn by the same deduction from any larger set of premises. The deduction remains a deduction no matter how the axioms are increased. This is monotonic reasoning, much imitated in other, less certain, disciplines. The very nature of monotonic reasoning makes mathematical proofs permanent, independent of new information. Thus it has been since Euclid and Aristotle. Theorems with complete proofs are never withdrawn due to later knowledge. It is little exaggeration to say that mathematicians never reject the completed proofs of their predecessors, except to complain about their constructivity.
Mathematicians build directly on the works of their forebears stretching back two and a half millenia to Euclid. Our current mathematical reasoning is merely a fleshed out version of Euclid's. Monotonic reasoning marks theoretical mathematics as a discipline. The traditional systems of mathematical logic are monotonic since they simply reflect mathematical usage. Tarski [35] described a calculus of deductive systems and captured in a simple way the general concept of a monotonic formal system. His formulation includes all logics traditionally studied: intuitionistic, modal, and classical. He did not qualify his definition, as we do, with the adjective "monotone", because there were no other systems studied at that time.
Minsky [24] suggested that there is another sort of reasoning which is not monotonic. This is reasoning in which we deduce a statement based on the absence of any evidence against the statement. Such a statement is in the category of beliefs rather than in the category of truths. Modem science offers statistics as a tool for establishing provisional beliefs, but in many instances we have no basis for applying statistics, due to a lack of governing distributions or samples for the problem at hand.
What role does belief play in our affairs? Often we must make sharp "yes or no" decisions between alternative actions. There may be no deductive or statistical base which justifies our choice, or there may be such a base but we may not be able to wait for missing information; it may never materialize anyway. Often all we have as a basis for decision is surmise, that is, deductions from beliefs as well as truths and statistically derived statements. These beliefs are often accepted, and used, as premises for deduction and choice of action due to an unquantified lack of evidence against them.
A philosopher's much-quoted example is about Tweety. We observe only birds that can fly, and accept the belief that all birds can fly from the absence of evidence for the existence of non-flying birds. We are told that Tweety is a bird, and conclude that Tweety can fly using our belief as premise. Later, we observe that Tweety is a pet ostrich and clearly cannot fly. We reject our previous belief set and conclusions as a basis for decision making, and are forced to choose a new belief set. The new set of beliefs may also include equally uncertain statements, accepted due to a lack of evidence against them. But we blithely draw consequences from the new belief set and make decisions on that basis till contrary evidence on some accepted belief is garnered, at which time we again have to acquire a new set of beliefs.
This has happened in the history of practically every subject except mathematics. The principles of physics, or biology, have been changed with every scientific revolution, even though unreflective practitioners of each age think that final principles have been found. For mathematics, the Dutch mathematician and philosopher L.E.J. Brouwer would have argued that the belief in theorems established by "non-constructive methods" was unjustified, and that a new belief set based on constructive principles should be adopted in its place. Other mainstream mathematicians, such as Hilbert, did not agree with this position. Some philosophers of mathematics living now would argue that, even within classical mathematics, the independence proofs for propositions of set theory, such as the continuum hypothesis or the axiom of choice, indicate there are several incompatible axiomatic systems which, as belief sets, could be the foundation of mathematics.
One can envisage making up nonmonotone logics describing the mathematical nature of belief. The exact result depends on the definition chosen for "lack of evidence against". McCarthy [22] initiated the study of nonmon__otonicity with his notion of circumscription. With all relation symbols but one, R, of a model (the world we are discussing) held fixed, and given axioms cp(R) relating that R to the other (fixed) relations of the model, the belief should be that, lacking further evidence to the contrary, R denotes the least relation R, if any, satisfying qo(R). If further evidence in the form of an additional axiom ~p(R) becomes available, then we should believe that R denotes the least R satisfying (qo/x ~k)(R), if any, instead, in a changed belief set.
There are now many different nonmonotonic systems, abstracted from different questions in computer science and AI. Among the other systems that have been studied areTheory of multiple believers of Hintikka [16] .
Truth-maintenance systems of Doyle [7] . Default logic of Reiter [32] . Autoepistemic logic of Moore [26] . Theory of individual and common knowledge and belief of Halpern and Moses [15] . Logic programming with negation as failure [1] . This, by no means, exhausts the list. What issues in artificial intelligence or computer science motivate these systems?
Suppose that we build a robot in a "blocks world" to navigate in a room, avoid obstacles and perform simple tasks, such as crossing the room with variable obstacles. We want the robot to learn principles from experience as to how to cross the room. At any given point, one may imagine that the robot should have a consistent deductively closed set of beliefs which are the current basis for its actions, including such provisional beliefs as "I can always traverse the left edge of the room since there has never been anything in the way there". But when such a principle is contradicted by new obstacles, the robot has to choose another belief set. So an important problem is to define what a belief set is and how to compute them and how to update them based on new evidence. Moore's autoepistemic logic [26] is really a first try at this problem, mostly for propositional logic.
In computers, the operating system and program obey rules which compute how to change state. In the absence of exceptional behaviour, such as an error condition or failure to access resources, there is a system of decision rules (beliefs) computing how to change the state of the machine in this "normal behavior", or "default" case. But when an exceptional behavior happens, we are thrown to a different set of decision rules for change of state, a different set of "beliefs". One wants to be able to deduce what is true of the machine in states when it is in a particular such "belief set". A logic for dealing with one such belief set at a time is Reiter's default logic.
In databases, facts and rules are stored as entries (the PROLOG model). Often also the database computes and stores conclusions, such as summary statistics or rules or tables computed from the database. These act as a deductive base for the set of current beliefs. When we query the database, we are asking for consequences of this belief set. When we update the database, all old entries that have changed have to be replaced and every consequence that uses these entries has to be recomputed and changed too. This is the process of replacing an old belief set by a new one. One often makes decisions on the basis of the absence of information in the database as well. A logic appropriate for describing a single such belief set is Doyle's truth-maintenance system [7] (see also de Kleer [5] ). Also, stable models for logic programming with negation as failure [8] arise in this way.
We expressed these examples informally in terms of the anthropomorphic notion of belief so as to bring out their common features. The actual nonmonotonic logics have much in common, and a number of translations between them have been proposed [10, 11, 18, 20, 31] . They have been investigated principally for propositional logic. Predicate versions suitable for actual applications are, up to now, pretty minimal.
Study of monotonic rule systems can be traced to the work of Post on "production systems" and to work of Tarski on the abstract properties of consequence relations for classical logic systems. The investigation of the nonmonotonic component is of much more recent nature and seems to appear first in the work of Reiter on default logic. Reiter's investigations involved finding a natural extension of classical logic which allows one to handle the negative information.
Independently Clark, and subsequently Apt, Blair and Walker, and also (extending their work) Gelfond and Lifschitz, studied negation as failure in logic programming. It has turned out that these investigations are in a common direction. Mutual relationships were uncovered by Bidoit and Froidevaux, [3] and Marek and Truszczyfiski [21] , who exhibited the precise nature of the connection between logic programming and default logic. The reevaluation of default extensions in terms of "context-dependent proofs" by Marek and Truszczyfiski, which has its roots in the Apt, Blair and Walker's [2] "elementary interpreter", for which it may serve as a clarifying definition, is a point of departure for the investigations of this paper. Here, drawing on all the research mentioned above for inspiration, we present a coherent unified theory of nonmonotonic formal systems.
At the level of abstraction we achieve, we are finally able to see that nonmonotone systems pervade ordinary mathematical practice. There is no sign of any realization of the existence of such mathematical examples in the previous nonmonotonic logic literature. Perhaps these connections can only be seen by having a common abstract notion. What this commonality does for us is to make available known mathematical techniques from other areas of conventional mathematics for constructing and classifying belief sets (extensions) and, simultaneously, to make evident a common thread among disparate parts of mathematics and disparate nonmonotonic systems from artificial intelligence and computer science.
On the level of Mathematical Philosophy there is a connection worth stating as well. Nonmonotone reasoning takes place during the process of discovery of mathematical theorems, when one posits temporarily some proposition on the basis of no evidence against it, and explores the consequences of such a belief until new mathematical facts force their abandonment. These nonmonotone belief sets have their traces eradicated when final belief sets are achieved and demonstrative proofs are finished and published. The only hint of provisional belief sets left in mathematical papers is in the motivational remarks explaining what obstacles were overcome and by what changes in viewpoint the proof was achieved.
Here is the main definition. A nonmonotone rule system consists of a set U and a set of triples (a, t, 7) called rules. Here a = (al,..., a n) is a finite sequence of dements of U, called premises, and fl = (fla,..., ilk) is a finite sequence of elements from U, called restraints, and "r is an dement of U. This is written, generalizing a notation of default logic, as al ," ", an : ~1 ,' ' 9 ~k ),
The informal reading is: From a 1 .... , a n being established, and ill,..., fig not being established now or ever, conclude ),. You may substitute "computed" for "established" for an informal reading in many applications. A subset S of U is called deductively closed if for every rule of the system, whenever al,..., a n are in S and ill,..., flk are not in S, then V is in S. There are no variables here, these are not schema, this version is not the one appropriate for nonmonotone predicate logics. Nonmonotonic predicate logic cannot be exposited in a few lines and we defer that to a later paper.
The intersection of all deductively closed sets containing a set I is generally not deductively closed. But the intersection of a descending chain of deductively closed sets is deductively closed, and I may be contained in many minimal deductively dosed sets over I. In the context of nonmonotone logic the intersec-tion of all deductively dosed sets containing I is a (non-deductively closed) set, called the set of secure consequences of I. These are the propositions that a "skeptical reasoner" would take as beliefs based on I. The most important notion of contemporary nonmonotonic logic is that of extension. For a fixed subset S of U, one defines (finite) derivations from I, where all restraints encountered are outside S, and all premises encountered are either conclusions of previous rules or in I. This defines the set Cs(I ) of S-consequences of I. Extensions are those S such that S = C s (I). Extensions are minimal deductively dosed sets containing I, but not conversely. Extensions represent the "deductively dosed belief sets" that contain I. In these sets, if the negative restraints are all obeyed, we are reduced to monotone reasoning. See section 3 for the exact definition.
These simple definitions capture the common content of the several theories of nonmonotonicity listed above, and of many mathematical theories as well. For example, the set of all marriages of the marriage problem can be formulated as exactly the set of all extensions in a nonmonotone rule system; similarly for the set of all k-colorings of graphs, the set of chain covers of partial orders, the Stone space of all maximal ideals in a Boolean algebra, etc. Similarly, for a commutative ring with unit there is a nonmonotone rule system such that the deductively closed sets are the prime ideals, the McCoy radical (the set of nilpotents) is the set of secured consequences of (0}, etc. There are similar nonmonotonic systems associated with virtually every algebraic system for which radicals of some sort have been defined and characterized. These mathematical examples have suggested a whole new set of techniques for finding extensions because of the availability of algorithms already investigated in the mathematical literature on one or another of these problems, not previously known to be relevant to nonmonotonic logic in the artificial intelligence community. They do not arise from logic, but really from operations research. Finally, in recursion theory, priority constructions can be construed as nonmonotone systems, sets constructed by the priority argument as extensions. These ideas give many constructions of recursively enumerable extensions.
We spend a lot of effort in both this and subsequent papers to answer the following question. Exactly how complicated is the set of extensions of a recursively specified nonmonotonic system, and what is its structure? This is the analogue of the classical logic question, how complicated is the set of complete theories containing a recursively enumerable theory, and what is its structure? In classical logic, this leads to analyzing the character of the set of maximal ideals containing a given recursively enumerable ideal in a recursively presented free Boolean algebra, a subject in which two of the authors have a lot of experience (see [27, 33] ). The simplest case covering many nonmonotonic systems arising from mathematics is that of "highly recursive" nonmonotone rule systems. There it turns out that extensions can, up to a one-to-one recursive map, be exactly any bounded H ~ class of sets of natural numbers. So even in this case the computational problems are of the same level of difficulty as (say) solving the "marriage problem" for highly recursive societies, or finding orderings of recursively presented formally real fields [23] , or finding an abcissa between 0 and 1 where a given recursive continuous function on [0,1] takes a maximum value [17] . This recursion-theoretic methodology can also be refined to give complexity-theoretic results on the same problems about extensions, as has been done in algebra by Nerode and Remmel in [28] [29] [30] . Since this is a more delicate matter than the recursion theory, these developments are deferred again to a later paper.
Next, we turn to investigations of the semantics of nonmonotonic rule systems. The fundamental common semantics we have found comes from L,~,,~, and generalizes the Clark completion of logic programming. It is perfectly general, and gives systematic semantics and completeness for all the nonmonotonic logics discussed above. Such uniform semantics are new. Some of the subjects never before had a decent semantics. We find semantical representations of extensions, weak extensions and deductively closed sets. This representation requires the creation of an additional infinitary language s s which properly encodes not only rules as "first order objects", but also additional (infinitary) objects which characterize the class of intended structures be they extensions, weak extensions, deductively closed sets, etc. The previously established characterization of default logic, in terms of nonmonotonic rule systems, provides us with a semantics for default logic. This semantics, in opposition to the attempt of Etherington, satisfies Tarski's conditions. That is, it allows us to introduce for defaults (virtual) negations, conjunctions, etc., and also a natural entailment relation. Computer scientists have a prejudice against L,~,, 0 since on the surface it is removed from computation. But this is only on the surface -well-founded relations of small recursive ordinal height are the "correct" basis for our algorithms for computing extensions and represent L,~,~ deductions -so perhaps the prejudice against L,~,,~ should be reconsidered.
Finally, we turn to the issue of computing extensions, weak extensions, and sets dosed under rules. We provide algorithms for testing whether a given subset of the universe U is an extension, weak extension, etc. Since we have previously provided a reduction algorithm to the monotonic case, an extension of the Truszczyfiski variant of the Gelfond-Lifschitz procedure for testing stability, we are able to use an analytical tableau method to compute the least fixpoint of a monotonic operator.
This short summary indicates that there is a great wealth of problems and results which naturally arise from nonmonotonic rule systems. Our study delineates the role of deduction schemata. This, in turn, connects our work naturally with studies of inductive definability. Our work indicates that logic programming is less related to predicate calculus than to inductive definability. This is a paradigm different from Kowalski's. We do not claim that this is the only "correct" position, but we do claim that it leads to a new direction for research.
The predicate logic case is not treated in this paper. It will come out from a schematic version of the theory of this paper analogous to Post production systems. Along with U, the set of all strings over an alphabet, there are typed "metavariables" ranging over specific subsets of U called "types". There are "metastrings" built from the alphabet of U and string variables. Rules are of the same form as before, but use metastrings instead of strings. This point of view gives rise not only to a general theory, but also gives outright syntax, semantics, and completeness for new predicate versions of all the logics mentioned above. It also gives nonmonotone classical, or intuitionistic, or modal predicate and propositional logics.
Monotonic formal systems
Tarski [35] characterized monotonic formal systems by means of monotonic rules of inference. Such systems include intuitionistic logic, classical logics, modal logics, and many others. Suppose that a nonempty set U is given. In a particular application U may be the collection of all statements or all formulas, or all legal strings of a formal system, or of all atomic statements as in logic programming.
A monotonic rule of inference is a tuple r = (P,cp), where P = (al,... , an} is a finite list of objects from U, and tp is an element of U. Such a rule r is usually written in the suggestive form Ot 1 , 9 0t n r= (1) cp
We call al,... , a n the premises of r and q0 the conclusion of r. (Where a~ is the cardinality of the set of natural numbers.) Property (3) reflects the finitary nature of deductive closure and is closely associated with the definition of a deduction.
An axiom is a rule without premises, that is, with the list P empty.
A deduction of an object cp ~ U from Ic U is a finite sequence (tpl,..., Cpm ) such that ep,,=% and for all i<m, %~1, or % is an axiom, or % is the conclusion of a rule r ~ M such that premises of r are included in ( cpl, ..., %_ 1 }" Then T(I) consists of all elements of U that possess a deduction from I.
Tarski made the easy observation that if a collection D of subsets of U possesses properties (1), (2) and (3) above, then there is a collection of monotone rules M such that D is the set of all deductively closed sets in (U, M).
An abstract treatment of monotonic logic programming schemes and general methods of processing queries is discussed in [4] .
Nonmonotonic formal systems
Inspired by Reiter [32] and Apt [1] , we introduce the notion of a nonmonotonic Either P, or G, or both may be empty. If P --G--~ then the rule r is called an axiom. A nonmonotonic formal system is a pair (U,N), where U is a non-empty set and N is a set of nonmonotonic rules. Each monotonic formal system can be identified with the nonmonotonic system in which every monotonic rule is given an empty set of restraints.
A subset S_ U is called deductively closed if, for every rule of N, if all premises a 1 .... , a, are in S and all restraints /31,...,/3m are not in S, then the conclusion cp belongs to S.
In nonmonotonic systems, deductively closed sets are not generally closed under arbitrary intersections as in the monotone case. Tarski The following is a sufficient condition for X to be a deductively closed set in (U, N ). PROPOSITION 3.1 If X is a hit set for ~rv, N, then X is deductively closed in (U,N).
The converse to proposition 3.1 does not hold. If U = { a, r, "r }, N = ( a : fl/7 }, then ~ is deductively closed for (U,N), but this is not a hit set for ~ru, u.When N is finite, it is easy to give an algorithm based on proposition 3.1 for finding all minimal deductively closed sets. This algorithm .is a variant of a "brute force" algorithm based on enumerating all hit sets. Given a set S and an I_ U, an S-deduction of qo from I in (U, N) is a finite sequence (qq,..., ~0 k) such that c& = cp and, for all i < k, each % is in I, or is an axiom, or is the conclusion of a rule r ~ N such that all the premises of r are included in (qq,..., %-1} and all restraints of r are in U\S (see [20] , also [31] ).
An S-consequence of I is an element of U occurring in some S-deduction from 1.
Let Cs(1 ) be the set of all S-consequences of I in (U,N). 1 is a subset of Cs(I).
Note that S enters solely as a restraint on the use of the rules imposed by the restraints in the rules. A single restraint in a rule in N may be in S and therefore prevent the rule from ever being applied in an S-deduction from 1, even though all the premises of that rule occur earlier in the deduction. Thus S contributes no members directly to Cs(I ), although members of S may turn up in Cs(I ) by an application of a rule which happens to have its conclusion in S. For a fixed S, the operator Cs(. ) is monotonic. That is, if Icc_J, then Cs(1) C_Cs(J ). Also, G(G(I)) = Cs(I).
Generally, Cs(1 ) is not deductively closed in (U,N). It is perfectly possible that all the premises of a rule be in Cs(I ), the restraints of that rule are outside Cs(I), but a restraint of that rule be in S, preventing the conclusion from being put into Cs (1 ) . 
Proof
If all the premises of a rule r are in Cs(I ) and all the restraints are outside Cs(I), then all the restraints are also outside S.
[]
We say that S _ U is grounded in I if S c_ Cs(I ). Thus S is a weak extension if S is generated by I and the conclusions of rules that are applicable. The notion of weak extension is related to Clark's logic program completion and will be investigated below. The notion of groundedness is related to the phenomenon of "reconstruction". S is grounded in I if all elements of S are S-deducible from I (remember that S influences only the negative sides of rules). S is an extension of I if two things happen. First, every element of S is deducible from I, that is, S is grounded in I (this is an analogue of the adequacy property in logical calculi). Second, the converse holds: all the S-consequences of I belong to S (this is the analogue of completeness). Thus extensions are analogues for nonmonotonic systems of the set of all consequences for monotonic systems. Both properties (adequacy and completeness) need to be satisfied -if we want S to be an extension. The third concept, weak extension, is a closure property. In the process of constructing Cs(I), S is used to generate only negatively as a restraint. But we can relax our requirements and allow deductions that use S also on the positive side. That is, elements of S are not treated as "axioms", but are used to generate objects from U by also testing the positive side of a rule for membership in S. This concept is closely related with the fixpoints of the operator Tp in logic programming, and Clark's completion (see [1] ). We shall prove a similar representation of weak extensions as fixpoints of an operator associated with a nonmonotonic system. The notion of an extension is related to that of a minimal deductively closed set. An extension of I is a weak extension of I.
Proof
Assume that S is an extension of I, that is, S = Cs(I). We need to prove that This operator is closely related to the operator T e as considered in logic programming (see [1] ). As in the case of general logic programs, the operator T is not monotone in general. But if ~ is a monotone system, that is all rules in N have no restraints, then T is monotone. Operator T computes the collection of conclusions of/-applicable rules.
The following result generalizes one for logic programming. PROPOSITION 3.6 Let (U,N) be a nonmonotonic rule system. Let T be its associated operator, and let S ___ U. Then: 
(1) restates the definition of deductively closed set. (2) =~. We assume that T(S) = S and then prove that S is a weak extension of in (U,N). We must show that S = Cs(R) where R is the set We prove that S = T(S). It is worth noting that deductively dosed sets here play the role that Herbrand models of programs play in logic programming. Weak extensions here play a role similar to that of supported models of programs, that is models of Clark's completion, in logic programming. This analogy will become dearer when we discuss the semantic issues (see also section 3 of part II). Here extensions of rule systems play a role analogous to that of stable models of logic programs in logic programming.
Following the analogy with logic programming, a set S such that T(S) _ S is called a prefixpoint of T. Since T is not, in general, a monotone operator, the Knaster-Tarski theorem cannot be applied. There is no guarantee that T possesses a fixpoint. U is, of course, a prefixpoint of T, so prefixpoints of T always exist. Our remark that deductively closed sets are closed under intersections of descending families implies the following corollary by the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma: COROLLARY 3.8
For every system (U,N), and for every S __ U which is a prefixpoint of T, there is a minimal prefixpoint S' of T, S' _ S.
With each rule r of form (2), we associate a monotonic rule of form (1) , ax,..., a, 
If S is an extension of 1, then S is closed under S-deductions. We can define a mapping from S-deductions from I in (U,N) to deductions from I in the monotone system (U,M(S)), by projecting the rules, that is, by dropping all restraints. By induction on the length of proofs we can show that none of the rules that were applied has been eliminated. Also, this map is surjective. This shows that if S = Cs(I) (in (U,N) ), then also S = T(I) in (U,M(S) ). Conversely, every deduction of qo in (U,M(S)) can be lifted to an S-derivation of tp in (U, N). An inductive argument shows that every S-derivation arises from lifting. This shows that S = T(I) in (U,M(S)) and implies that S is an extension of I.
[] Actually, the projection procedure can be relaxed somewhat. Instead of eliminating all the rules that have a premise outside of S or a restraint in S, it is enough to eliminate those that have restraints in S. Indeed, the rule r-a I .... , a, : ill,.-., B,,/q0 with an a,. ~ S is either inapplicable or, if it is applicable, then it witnesses the fact that the Cs(I ) is not S. Let N+(S) be the collection of rules in N whose restraints are all outside of S, and let (U,M+S)) be the projection of (U,N+(S)). [] The "relaxed" procedure for generating suitable collection of monotonic rules is closely connected to the Gelfond-Lifschitz procedure [9] for stable models of logic programs. The "tight" procedure is a generalization of the Truszczyfiski procedure [21] . Theorem 3.9 tells us how to test if a collection S _ U is an extension of I in (U, N). In case U and N are finite this leads to an algorithm.
(1) Compute N(S). (2) Project N(S) by dropping restraints to get M(S). Finding all the extensions of a given I is a complicated problem. A brute force algorithm is to generate all subsets of U, and test each of them for being an extension using the procedure above. A useful fact for improving this algorithm is:
If S is a extension of I, then S consists entirely of elements of ! and conclusions of certain rules in N.
Thus an element of U that is not a conclusion of any rule is never in an extension.
A simple construction allows us to consider only extensions of the empty set. In fact, if 5 a is a nonmonotonic rule system, and I ___ U, then the system 5a(I) arises from ~ and I by adding to N all the rules of the form :/~9 for all ~9 ~ I. We then have: PROPOSITION 3.12 T is an extension of I in 5 a if and only if T is an extension of ~ in 6a(I).
Consequently, we shall consider below extensions of ~. We say that T is an extension of 6 a if T is an extension of ~ in 5 '~. 
Examples and applications in logic, logic programming, and commonsense reasoning

,k
The collection of derivable elements of U is the set of tautologies of propositional logic. To represent the least fixed point of the operator associated with this system by the tableaux method requires the introduction of additional rules and the elimination of modus ponens (the fourth group) as a rule.
OTHER CLASSICAL SYSTEMS
Propositional logic may be represented in other ways as well, for instance in the language with the usual connectives --,, A, V, ~. The collection U then consists of all well-formed formulas of such a language. The exact set of rules depends on the actual axiomatization adopted. Intuitionistic logic may be similarly represented as a rule system using appropriate axioms. Likewise for modal logics.
ORDIlqARY CLAUSAL LOGIC PROGRAMMING
Here U is defined as follows: First, we have a fixed collection At of atoms. U is the set of all pairs <a,L) such that a~At, and L is a finite subset of At (L = ~ is allowed). Thus, a clause p ~ ql,..., qr is represented as a pair <p, (ql,..., qr }). A logic program is a collection consisting of two lists of rules:
(1) (Specific rules) Rules of form :/q0 for q0 ~ P where P _ U.
(2) (Processing rules) Rules of form:
<il,L> : <il,L\ {
for every a ~ L. The pure PROLOG processing method, creating and processing goals, works here.
It is worth mentioning that, although on the surface the same things happen here as in logic programming, in reality more is being computed, namely, all th~ proper Horn clauses derivable from the clauses in the "specific rules". It is however, true that the atoms computed in this process constitute the least mode of the program.
PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC PROGRAMMING, MONOTONIC RULES CASE
Here the set U consists of logical atoms. This system does not contai processing rules at all. The specific clauses are represented in a different fashioJ namely as rules: Computing all extensions of a default theory can be achieved using the techniques developed in section 4, part II. Notice that during the computation we need to test if the rule is S-applicable. This requires checking if a ~ S, ~fll,... ,~flm ~ S. This can be carried out by the ordinary tableaux method, or any other complete theorem prover. These remarks are the source of the algorithm of [19] , in which a version specifically tailored to default logic is developed.
PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC PROGRAMMING, GENERAL CASE
A general logic program is a list of general clauses, of the form: P ~ ql,..., qn~rl .... ,--nrm.
We refer to [8] for the definition of a stable model of such a program. That concept is a generalization of the perfect models as introduced in [2] .
Let U be the collection of atoms under consideration. Represent a general clause as a rule: ql,..., qn : rl,..., rm P
The translation tr(P) of a program P is the set of translations of its individual clauses.
The following result was proved in [3] and [21] :
PROPOSITION 4.2 A subset M_ U is a stable model of P if and only if M is an extension of tr( P).
However, weak extensions correspond to so-called supported models of P (cf. Apt [1] ). PROPOSITION 4.3 A subset M_ U is a supported model of P if and only if M is a weak extension of tr(P).
LOGIC PROGRAMMING WITH CLASSICAL NEGATION
We now discuss the so-called "logic programming with classical negation" of [9] as a chapter in the theory of nonmonotonic formal systems. Recall the basic notions introduced in [9] . The collection of objects appearing in heads or bodies of clauses is the set of all literals, that is, atoms or negated atoms. In particular, a negated atom may appear in the head of a clause. Consider first "general Horn" clauses in which literals may appear in arbitrary places. To each set P of such clauses assign its answer set, the least collection A of literals satisfying the following two conditions: and let tr(P) be the collection of translations of clauses in P plus the structural rules Str. Then we have PROPOSITION 4.4 A subset A c_C_ Lit is an answer set for P if and only if A is an extension of tr(P). Since tr(P) is a set of monotonic rules, such an answer set is the least fixpoint of the (monotonic) operator associated with the translation.
Gelfond and Lifschitz then introduce general rules. Since the negation used in literals is not the "negation-as-failure" of general logic programming, Gelfond and Lifschitz introduce another negation symbol "not" and a general logic clause with classical negation in the form: a *--bl,..., b,,not(Ca) .... , not (Cm) .
Then the answer set for a set P of clauses of this form is introduced by merging the operational procedure for the construction of stable models for a program (as introduced in [8] ) with the procedure above. They define the answer set for a program with classical negation as follows: A number of facts proved in [9] then become corollaries of the theory outlined here. Also, our results show that we get the same answer set if we tighten the operational definition of answer set for a general program, and change condition (1) to: (1' ) If C contains in the body a literal a which is not preceded by not and does not belong to M or it contains a string not(b) with b belonging to M, then eliminate C altogether. ((2) is left unaltered.)
Representation of combinatorial and algebraic problems as structures associated with rule systems
The next set of examples show that the notions of extension, weak extension, and deductively closed set for nonmonotonic rule systems occur naturally throughout mathematics, particularly in combinatorics. This connection of nonmonotonic theories with everyday mathematics was not previously known.
THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM
A society, 6 #= (B,G,K) is a set B of boys, a set G of girls such that B r G = ~, and a relation K_ B • G, the intended meaning of (b,g) ~ K being "b knows g". A marriage for a society 6 a is a map M: B ~ G. A marriage M is proper if M is one-to-one and for all b ~ B, M(b) = g implies K(b,g). That is, in a proper marriage each boy marries a girl he knows. A marriage M is symmetric if M maps B onto G. In a symmetric marriage, every girl is married.
For finite societies Philip Hall [13] gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a proper marriage, namely: (*) For every finite set of boys B" c_ B, the set of girls that are all known by the boys of B' has cardinality greater or equal than that of B'. Marshall Hall [14] showed that condition (*) is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of marriages in an infinite society 5: as long as each boy knows only finitely many girls. Philip Hall's theorem is a special case of a more general theorem for finding transversals (see [25] ).
We claim that if 6 a= (B,G,K) is a society satisfying (*) in which each boy knows only finitely many girls, then there is a nonmonotonic rule system 
where we adopt the convention that for any n-element sequence sl,..., s,, let sl .... , gk,..., S, be the (n-1)-element sequence that results from sl,..., s, by removing s k. For any girl g and any two boys b I r bE, each of whom knows g, add the following rules to N( 6 a):
Mbl g' Mb2 g: (6) cp for every q0 E U(~9'). Let N(~ a) consist of all the rules of the form (5) or (6).
THEOREM 5.1
Let Sa= (B,G,K) be a society satisfying (*), for which each boy knows only finitely many girls. Then E is an extension for 2Lr= (U (S#),N(6a) ) if and only if M e = {(b,g) : Mbg ~ E} is a proper marriage for S#.
Proof
(=~) First, observe that if b ~ B knows only one girl g, then the rule :/Mbg belongs to N = N(rz), so that Mbg ~ E for any extension E. Let B 1 ___ B be the set of boys in B who know only one girl. Since 5 a satisfies condition (*), we know that there is a proper marriage for 6 a, so that there can be no girl g such that there exist boys b I and b z in B 1 for whom Mblg and Mb2g are in U = U(Sa). Hence if we can apply rules of the form (6) (6) is E-applicable, and E is a weak extension, then the same argument used in the proof of theorem 5.1 shows that M e must be a proper marriage. Finally, observe that if D is deductively closed and D ~ U, then none of the rules of (6) are D-applicable. Moreover, it will be still the case that for each boy b ~ B, the rules of the form (5) will force at least one Mbg i ~ D. However it is possible to have Mb& and Mbgj in D with gi --/: gj, in which case none of the rules of the form (5) for b force elements into D. Thus deductively closed sets D ~ U correspond to marriages in which each boy marries at least one girl he knows and may marry several girls he knows, but no girl is married to more than one boy. Consequently, minimal deductively closed sets correspond again to proper marriages. By expanding our set of rules N(6 a), we can ensure that extensions correspond to proper symmetric marriages. That is, suppose that SP= <B,G,K> is a society in which every boy knows only finitely many girls, and every girl knows only finitely many boys, and there is a symmetric marriage for S a. Let U be defined as before. In addition to all rules of form (5) and (6), add a set of rules for each g ~ G.
If g~G and (b a .... ,b,} is the set of boys that g knows, then add the following set of rules:
A : Mblg,...,Mbkg .... , Mb, g Mbkg (7) Let Nsym(~ ) be the collection of rules of form (5), (6) , and (7) and let Usym(6a ) = U. By a proof which is similar to that of theorem 5.1, we can prove the following: THEOREM 5.2 Let ~= < B,G, K) be a society such that each boy knows only finitely many girls and each girl knows only finitely many boys, and there is a proper symmetric marriage for 6 a. Then E is an extension for .o~ = <Usy,,,(~9~), NSym(SP)> if and only if Me= (<b,g>:Mbg~ E} is a proper symmetric marriage for Sa.
PROPER k-COLORINGS OF GRAPHS
Let ~= (V, E > be a graph, where V is the set of vertices of ~, and E is the set of edges of ~. For x~ V, Nb(x)=(y~ V:(x,y) ~E} denotes the set of neighbors of x in ~. We say that ~ is locally finite if Nb(x) is finite for all x ~ X. A map C:V--, (1,.. Again we can show that the only weak extension of (U(fg),N(ff)) which is not an extension is U(fg) itself. Also we can show that the deductively closed sets D _ U(ff) correspond to the colorings for which each vertex is assigned at least one, but possibly many, colors and if (x,y) ~ E, then it cannot be the case that there is a color i that is assigned to both x and y.
CHAIN COVERS OF PARTIALLY ORDERED SETS
Let ~= (D, < o) be a partially ordered set, that is < o is a binary relation on D such that (i) Vx~DX < DX, (ii) Vx,y, zeD(X < DY A y < DZ ~ X < DZ), (iii) Vx,y~n(X <__ ,y A y < D x =' X =y). For x, y ~ D we say that x is incomparable to y, written x [y, if neither x <_ DY nor y <_ u x. We say that a set A _c D is an antichain if, whenever x q:y and x, y ~ A, then x [ y. We define the width of ~ to be w if the maximum size of an antichain is w. We say that a set C _ D is a chain if, whenever x, y ~ C, then either x <, y or y <_ ,x.
We say that a set of chains { C 1 .... , C n } is a chain cover of ~ or that ~ is covered by C 1, ..., Cn if D = (3 ~,=1 C i. We say that a chain cover of ~ is disjoint if the chains are pairwise disjoint. Clearly any chain cover for ~ can be refined to a disjoint chain cover for ~. Dilworth [6] proved the following fact for finite partially ordered sets: PROPOSITION 5.4 If ~ = (D, < D) is a partially ordered set of width w, then there are w chains C1,..., Cw in 9~ which cover ~.
Dilworth's theorem can be extended for partially ordered sets of arbitrary cardinality by applying the Compactness Theorem for propositional logic. Then for any partially ordered set 9 ~= (D, < o) of width w, we can define a rule system (U(~),N(9~)) such that the extensions of (U(9~),N(9~)) correspond to disjoint chain covers of ~ by w chains C1,..., C w. Note that for disjoint chain covers Again we can show that the only weak extension of (U(9 ~) ,N(~)) which is not an extension is U(9~). Also we can show that the deductively closed sets D 4:U(9 ~) correspond to assignments in which each x ~ D is assigned to at least one, but possibly many, chains, and if x ly, then x and y are not assigned to the same chain. Thus deductively closed sets D r U(9 ~) correspond to arbitrary chain covers of 9 ~.
The above examples are just a few of many examples where extensions correspond to "solutions" of certain natural combinatorial problems. Next, we turn to problems in algebra where extensions naturally occur.
MAXIMAL IDEALS IN A BOOLEAN ALGEBRA
Let ~ = (B, A, V, --1, Oa~, 1~) be a Boolean algebra, where A, v, and --1 are the operations of meet, join, and complement for ~, and O~ and la~ denote the Then, by an easy induction on the length of proofs, we can show that Cs(0) = { 0~ } so that B is not an extension.
(=) Note that if E is a maximal ideal, then rules of the form (13) ensure E ___ Ce(~). Successive applications of rules (12) , (15) , and (16) will produce no new elements. Then we can prove by induction on the length of proofs that we can never apply rules of the form (14) Now, suppose that W is a subspace of Voo. We claim that we can define a nonmonotonic rule system (U,N)= (Uw(Voo), Nw(V~o)) so that extensions of (U,N) correspond to the complementary subspaces for W that arise from the most natural construction of such spaces. That is, if one were going to construct a subspace A such that A 9 W--Voo, a natural way to proceed would be to construct a sequence of subspaces A 0 __ A1 __ ... in stages as follows: Stage 0. Let A 0 --{0}. Stage s + 1. Having defined a subspace A s _ V~ such that A s 9 W~ --V~ where IV, --WN V, for n >_ 1, we proceed according to one of two cases. Case 1: W~ is properly included in W~+ 1. In this case, it is easy to show that A s 9 W~+ 1 --V~+ 1, so we let As+ 1 --A s. Case 2: W~ = ~ + 1.
In this case it is easy to show that if we choose xs+ 1 ~ V~+I\ V~ and As+ 1 = (AsU (Xs+l} *), then As+ 1 c_ Vs+ 1 and As+ 1 * Ws+ 1 = Vs+ 1. Then A = U,A s is the desired complementary subspace of W. Note that we can get many different such complementary subspaces depending on the choice of xs+ 1 at each stage in which Case 2 occurs.
We define our nonmonotonic rule system (U,N} = (Uw(Voo), Nw(Voo)) as follows. We let U = Voo. Then we let N consist of the following five classes of rules:
XI,''', Xk: k (18) X,x, t=l for all x I .... , xk ~ V~, and ~1,-.., ~k ~ F, 
Proof
(~) Suppose that E= Ce(~ ). First observe that the rules of the form (17), (20) and (21) allow us to prove by induction on s that Es ___ Ce(~) for all s. Moreover it is not difficult to show by induction on the length of deductions that if we can deduce that some x ~ E is in Ce(~), then, at some point in the deduction we must use a rule of the form (21) to derive that some y ~ Ce(~), where y ~ E. But all the rules of the form (21) which have a y as a conclusion (where y ~ E) are blocked. Thus, we conclude that Ce ( ~ ) c_ E. Hence C e ( ~ ) = E.
[] We note that the example of subspaces forms a prototype for how nonmonotonic rule systems can be used to mirror stage constructions of substructures in a variety of algebraic situations. (~) Suppose that E is an extension of (U(~), N(~)). First we show that U(~) = U is not an extension of (U(~), N(~)). That is, it is easy to see that the only rule which does not have any premises and which is not blocked by U is :/0. Then, by induction on the length of derivations we can prove that the only element we can generate starting with 0 by applying rules in N(~) which are not blocked by U is 0 itself. Thus Cv(O ) = (0} v~ U.
PRIME IDEALS IN
Thus E ~ U. But then we see that rules of the form (28) and (29) [] Finally, following the intuitions from nonmonotonic logics, if we compute the collection of secure consequences of (U(8), N(8)) that is, the intersection of all extensions of (U(8), N(8)), then in the above case it corresponds to the radical of 8. Putting it more exphcitely we get the collection ( x : x ~ J } u { ~ : x ~ W } where J is the radical of 8 and W is the set of units of 8.
Conclusions and the contents of part II
This paper introduced the concept of a nonmonotonic rule system. We demonstrated that many existing forms of nonmonotonic reasoning due to Reiter (default logic), Doyle (truth maintenance), Gelfond and Lifschitz (stable semantics for logic programs), Clark (negation as failure), are naturally represented as nonmonotonic rule systems. We demonstrated that when these logics are interpreted as nonmonotonic rule systems, we get uniform treatments for concepts, theorems and algorithms. We also gave purely mathematical examples of nonmonotonic rule systems which show that nonmonotonic rule systems occur widely in mathematical practice.
In part II we will investigate the recursive complexity of the class of all extensions (or weak extensions or deductively closed sets) of a nonmonotonic rule system. In section 5 we proved that the set of all marriages for a "marriage problem" is represented exactly as the set of extensions~ in suitably chosen nonmonotonic rule systems. In part II we prove a converse for "highly recursive" societies. A similar result is obtained for graph colorings. A more general result, for recursive rule systems, and for general rule systems will be published in part III of this paper. The connection with the "marriage problem" provides a wealth of recursive-theoretic results on extensions of highly recursive nonmonotonic rule systems and therefore many new results for the known nonmonotonic logics mentioned above. In part II we give an "infinitary" semantics for nonmonotonic systems in the logic .~e,o,,,~ based on infinitary disjunction, conjunction and negation. In the case when the domain U of the nonmonotonic system is ~0, using the arithmetical hierarchy of functions as in Rogers [34] , we find the class of all extensions, weak extensions, closed sets and minimal closed sets. These classes are, respectively, /-/0,~v (effectively Gs), H ~ H ~ (effectively closed), and/-/0,N. We get various results on Reiter's default theories, and Gelfond and Lifschitz stable models of general logic programs.
Finally, we discuss various algorithms of computing extensions, weak extensions, and minimal closed sets for nonmonotonic rule systems.
